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Countries globally are heavily dependent on undersea communication cables which are run by commercial companies and tend to be neglected by national governments.
 ▶ 97% of global communications are transmitted via these cables which are part 
of a network of an estimated 212 cable systems containing 750,000 miles of fiber.
 ▶ Satellite technology is unable to handle modern digital economic and societal 
requirements.
 ▶ Individual days may see $10 trillion in financial transfers by these cables and 15 
trillion financial transactions processed.
 ▶ Undersea cables are also imperative for aviation and industries using cloud 
computing and artificial intelligence.
 ▶ Repairing these cables is a complicated process requiring determining the 
location of the break using a built-in monitoring system, the owner contacting 
cable repair sites to assess damage, time needed to repair damage may range 
from hours or days with the average global repair time being 27 days in 2019.
 ▶ In early August 2019, India shut down Internet and phone service in Jammu 
and Kashmir to deter opposition to legislation changing the status of these 
disputed regions.
 ▶ Within eleven days of this shutdown, shopkeepers were running short on 
vital supplies such as baby food and insulin which were usually ordered online 
while also creating cash shortages and the inability to process credit.
 ▶ Rupturing such lines globally would produce cascading failures immobilizing 
much of the international communications system and Internet for several weeks. 
Affected areas would include international finance, military logistics, medicine, 
commerce, agriculture, energy flows, food supply deliveries, and potentially 
produce a global depression.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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 These scenarios makes it imperative that the U.S. and its allies, and other 
international actors, enhance measures to ensure the security of undersea cables and 
severely punish those who would damage or destroy these critical infrastructures.  This 
work strives to enhance awareness of the vital economic and national security significance 
of these critical infrastructures and makes recommendations to ensure their security 
and reliability against potential attempts by hostile powers like China and Russia or other 
national, transnational, and subnational entities to take steps to sabotage and destroy these 
cables with ruinous consequences for personal and international economics and security.1  
It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys…that strike down the money power 
of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea, which drives 
the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive…by controlling the 
great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the 
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T his work provides historical and contemporary overviews of this critical geopolitical problem, describes the policy actors addressing this in the U.S. and selected other 
countries, and provides maps and information on many undersea cable work routes.  These 
cables are chokepoints with one dictionary choke points as “a strategic narrow route 
providing passage through or to another region.”3
OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL 
INTRODUCTION
FIRST TRANSOCE ANIC CABLE LINE
 Contemporary submarine cables 
began on July 29, 1858 when the HMS 
Agamemmon and USS Niagara met in the 
middle of the Atlantic Ocean joining over 
1,000 miles of copper cable by lowering it 
to the sea floor and completing the world’s 
first Trans-Atlantic cable stretching from 
Ireland to Newfoundland.  Queen Victoria 
and President James Buchanan exchanged 
telegrams on August 16, 1858 and their 
combined messages of less than 100 words, 
took 17 hours and 40 minutes to transmit 
representing the fastest message ever sent 
between Washington and London. Despite 
the involvement of U.S. and Royal Navy 
ships, this was a private sector owned and 
financed endeavor owned and financed by 
the Atlantic Telegraph Company created by 
New York businessman Cyrus West Field 
(1819-1892).4
FIGURE 1: 1858 ATLANTIC SUBMARINE CABLE MAP
Source: Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper5  
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 Development of undersea 
cables would play a major role in enabling 
the British Empire to administer its 
dispersed dominions and respond to 
strategic contingencies6   An 1859 U.S. 
State Department report on international 
commerce contains ample documentation 
of the economic significance of submarine 
cables in the United Kingdom and other 
countries.7   In 1884, the Convention 
for the Protection of Submarine Cables 
was signed by 40 different countries 
establishing the precedent that, “The 
breaking or injury of a submarine cable, 
done willfully or through culpable 
negligence, and resulting in the total or 
partial interruption or embarrassment of 
telegraphic communication, shall be a 
punishable offense, but the punishment 
inflicted shall be no bar to a civil action 
for damages.”8  Evidence of the increasing 
importance of undersea cables in British 
imperial policymaking was reflected in 
the 1885 Submarine Telegraph Act, which 
imposed a maximum criminal penalty of five 
years imprisonment for anyone intentionally 
attempting to break or injure an undersea 
cable and up to three months imprisonment 
and a maximum fine of £100 ($486) ($14,300 
in 2021) if these cables were damaged by 
culpable negligence.9  
      The 1958 Geneva Convention on 
High Seas enacted the legal principle that 
nation states could not obstruct undersea 
cable construction in international waters 
in Articles 2 and 26.10  The 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) aspires to be the preeminent 
international legal instrument on oceans.  
It consists of 167 members and Articles 
112-115 cover undersea cables.  Article 112 
says countries are entitled to lay such 
cables and pipelines on the bed of high 
seas beyond the continental shelf.  Article 
113 enables countries to enact laws 
criminalizing the breaking of undersea 
cables by vessels of their own countries, 
but does not give warships the right to 
board vessels suspected of intentionally 
attempting to damage undersea cables 
in international waters, making it difficult 
for naval powers to deter hostile vessels 
from such activity.  Article 114 allows each 
country whose cables or pipelines are 
broken to compel the perpetrator to pay 
repair costs and Article 115 gives countries 
authority to adopt laws and regulations to 
sacrifice anchors or fishing gear to avoid 
injuring cables to be indemnified if they take 
all reasonable precautionary measures.  
UNCLOS provisions also fail to account for 
the emergence of fiber optical cables in the 
late 1980s, which have become predominant 
over satellites in international cable 
transmission.  During 2012 congressional 
testimony, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
noted that satellites could carry no more 
than 7% of U.S. voice and data traffic further 
illustrating the critical importance of 
undersea cables in international economic, 
legal, and strategic policymaking. 11
      The United States is one country 
which has not ratified UNCLOS despite 
efforts of presidential administrations 
of both parties and some elements 
within Congress and international affairs 
organizations to achieve this goal.  
Understandable reasons for U.S. refusal to 
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ratify UNCLOS include U.S. membership not 
providing maritime rights or freedoms the 
U.S. already enjoys and that maintaining 
a strong U.S. Navy is the best way for 
the U.S. to maintain its rights.  The U.S. 
already has a legal framework through 
domestic law and bilateral agreements 
for deep seabed mining and should not 
subject U.S. companies to the edicts of an 
unaccountable international bureaucracy 
forcing them to pay excessive fees to 
the International Seabed Authority for 
redistribution to developing countries.   
The U.S. is a sovereign nation and does not 
need an UN-based commission’s approval 
to access gas and oil resources in the 
U.S. continental shelf.  Royalties the U.S. 
retains for natural resource extraction 
should only be used to benefit the American 
public; resources the U.S. needs to access 
on its extended continental shelf can be 
negotiated through bilateral treaties with 
adjacent countries.  Acceding to UNCLOS 
would expose the U.S. to climate change 
lawsuits and other litigation brought by 
UNCLOS members, which would harm U.S. 
economic, environmental, and military 
interests; and the U.S. has successfully 
defended its Arctic interests since 
acquiring Alaska in 1867 and since UNCLOS’ 
establishment.  The U.S. gains nothing from 
ratifying UNCLOS.12
 Before discussing geopolitical 
implications of undersea cables, it is helpful 
to look at the multiple technological factors 
involved in creating this network covering 
TECHNOLOGIE S INVOLVED  
INCLUDING PATENT S
the world’s circumference.  Installing 
these cables is a highly professional skill 
requiring technologies such as automatic 
control, communication, and navigation.  
Required equipment for submarine 
cable installation includes a cable ship, 
jointing and testing equipment, and 
underwater installation equipment.  Cable 
ship infrastructure includes drum cable 
machines, linear cable machines for laying 
cable, submarine optical cable storage 
tanks, professional installation machines, 
and control management software.  During 
the 1960s and 1970s submarine coaxial 
communication cable development 
into the main methods of transoceanic 
communication.  Submarine cable curvature 
radius usually exceeds one meter and a 
radius of 1.5 meters is required  to ensure 
submarine communication cable and 
repeater safety between the pulley group 
design and ship stern during the laying 
process.13
      Submarine optical cable 
technology has experienced exponential 
development in subsequent decades 
including reaching weights of over 10,000 
tons, using drum-type and linear machine 
laying equipment.  Making greater use of 
Internet technology to facilitate installation 
and remote management, using burial 
machines weighing between 5-15 tons to 
bury cables one meter below the ocean 
floor, and the increasing use of remote 
operating vehicles to carry out cable 
installation.  This technological development 
has resulted in increased interconnectivity, 
which can be susceptible to physical and 
cyber-attacks.14
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The following pictures of patents and photographs of undersea cables document their 
physical appearance and illustrate the factors involved in installing these objects globally.
FIGURE 2:  PATENT, 4,278,835
15Source:  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
FIGURE 3:  PATENT 10,481,356
 
16Source:  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
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ORGANIZ ATION OF UNDERSE A 
CABLE S
 Undersea cables are produced 
and owned by private companies 
representing individual countries, 
multinational consortia, and some national 
governments.  These cables transmit 
most international voice and data traffic 
including military, government, emergency 
response, air traffic, subway, rail, and port 
traffic.   Stephen Malphrus, a former Chief 
of Staff to former Federal Reserve Chair Ben 
Bernanke noted, “When communication 
networks go down, the financial service 
sector does not grind to a halt, rather it 
snaps to a halt.”  These cables are part of 
a global network containing 750,000 miles 
of fiber and recent destruction of cables 
has had international repercussions.  There 
have been exponential increases in the 
speed of these over 160 years with a 2019  
transatlantic transfer by the company 
Infinera achieving a speed of 2.62 terabits 
per second or 4.8 million high definition 
movies simultaneously.  Cables cost $200-
$500 million to build with some cables 
being on top of the ocean floor in deep seas, 
those crossing shallower continental shelf 
waters are armored and buried one to two 
meters below the seafloor to protect them 
from damaging activities.17
     Recent years have seen 
natural and human caused events result 
in temporary disruption of undersea 
cables.  On December 26, 2006, a series of 
earthquakes off Taiwan’s southwest coast 
produced undersea landslides in the Luzon 
Strait severing six of seven undersea cables 
distributing Internet and phone services 
from North America to Taiwan, China, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and South Korea.  Taiwan’s 
largest telecommunications operator 
Chungwa Telecom reported 100% Internet 
outage to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, 
trading of the Korean won halted in Seoul, 
80% of Hong Kong’s communications 
capacity was wiped out in minutes, and 
Asia’s most important financial center had 
to rely on a SINGLE cable to transfer billions 
of dollars in trades and transfers globally.  It 
took 11 ships 49 days to finish repairs.18 
          Another example of disruption 
to undersea cables and its civil and 
military implications was reflected by 
the inadvertent December 2008 cutting 
of three undersea cables connecting 
Italy and Egypt.  This knocked out 80% 
of connectivity between Europe and the 
Middle East.   Pakistan lost 70% of its 
Internet connectivity and India lost between 
50-60% of its westbound connectivity. This 
was particularly problematic for the U.S. and 
British militaries, which had 200,000 troops 
in Iraq at that time and relied on commercial 
cable networks for 95% of their strategic 
communications.  U.S. Air Force Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were heavily used 
in counter-terrorism operations in Iraq and 
Pakistan.  These assets are remotely piloted 
from Europe and the U.S. requiring 500 MBs 
bandwidth to operate, which cannot be 
achieved without a strong undersea cable 
network.  Lieutenant Colonel Donald Fielded 
off the 50th US Communications Squadron 
stressed that these cable breaks caused 
UAV flights originating from Iraq’s Balad Air 
Force Base to fall from hundreds of daily 
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combat sorties to “tens.”  During its 2014 
conquest of Crimea, Russia made extensive 
use of hybrid warfare to seize control of the 
peninsula’s Internet infrastructure, control 
the information flow, and portray its actions 
as legitimate.  Russian Special Forces only 
need to secure an Internet exchange point 
at Simferopol to cut connections to the rest 
of Ukraine.19
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POLICYMAKING  
& LEGISL ATION
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZE AL AND 
GOVERNMENT AND POLICY 
STRUC TURE
 Australia and New Zealand are 
both heavily dependent on undersea 
cable communication for their economic 
growth and national security, which carry 
the preponderance of bulk voice and data 
traffic in and out of these countries.  A 
2013 Australian Parliamentary Library 
study determined nearly $A 220 billion 
($224.642 billion) in non-cash payments 
are made each business day using 
undersea cables representing 20% of Gross 
Domestic Product. Such factors have made 
them global leaders in developing legal 
architecture to protect their continuing 
access to these critical geopolitical 
infrastructures.   In 2005, the Australian 
Government establishing a regime for 
protecting these cables landing in Australia 
by giving the Australian Communications 
Authority (now the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA)) power to declare protection zones 
relating to undersea cables where certain 
activities may be prohibited, restrictions 
may be imposed on other activities, and 
carriers wishing to install undersea cables 
in Australian waters must apply and receive 
permission from ACMA.20 
     A 2013 Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI) study on this subject warned 
that the majority of these cables are located 
near protection zones in Perth and Sydney.  
This makes them vulnerable to accidental 
or intentional breakage, warned that the 
Australian Federal Police who is responsible 
for ensuring compliance with national 
laws takes a reactive instead of proactive 
enforcement approach, and that cable 
company owners and operators say the 
Australian Safety Authority and Fisheries 
Management Authority are not doing a good 
job of monitoring cable protection zones.  
A Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Center 
assessment noted cables are vulnerable 
to accidental damage from earthquakes, 
fishing trawlers, anchors, dumping, sand 
dredging, turbidity currents, and espionage 
by state actors and terrorists. 21
      During 2017/18 ACMA granted 
permission for installation of an undersea 
cable connecting Sydney and the United 
States, which was completed on June 
30, 2018; granted two protection zone 
installation permits to conduct Perth and 
Singapore; and approved three separate 
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requests extending the duration of existing 
protection zone permits. 22   Under current 
Australian law, the maximum penalties for 
intentionally interrupting or obstructing 
submarine communications is 12 months 
imprisonment and a fine of $A 4,200 
($3,226).  The maximum penalty for an 
individual engaging in conduct and being 
negligent and injuring an undersea vessel 
as a result of an Australian-flagged vessel 
breaking or injuring a submarine cable is 
3 months imprisonment and  a $A 2,100 
($1,613) fine.  An emerging undersea cable 
geopolitical matter Canberra will also have 
to confront is if neighboring countries such 
as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands decide to adopt Chinese Internet 
infrastructure unless Australia increases its 
development to these countries to expand 
and maintain their undersea cables. 23 
           Enforcing violations of undersea 
cable infrastructure is a problem in national 
and international law.  A 2007 Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal analysis was skeptical 
that national governments possessed the 
legal authority to arrest saboteurs under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and 2005 Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Convention Amendments.  This work 
went on to maintain that the possibility of 
terrorist attacks against undersea cables 
and pipelines was not considered by 
international legal authorities or giving 
nation states the international legal 
authority to protect pipelines and undersea 
cables. 24     
 During 2018, the Australian 
Government enacted the Security of 
Critical Infrastructure Act, which aspired 
to create a legal framework for managing 
critical infrastructure such as undersea 
cables.  This statute gave the Minister of 
Home Affairs responsibility for compiling 
a register of critical infrastructure assets 
but prohibiting the public disclosure of this 
register with a criminal penalty two years 
imprisonment and/ or fine of $A 26,640  
($20,463). 25 
     The legal foundation for New 
Zealand’s undersea cable protection 
begins with the 1996 Submarine Cables and 
Pipeline Protection Act.  This established a 
maximum criminal penalty of NZ $250,000 
($178,487) for anyone convicted of willfully 
or negligently damaging or permitting a 
ship or equipment to damage a submarine 
cable or pipeline and owns or operates 
the ship involved in causing such damage.  
This statute establishes fourteen Cable 
Protection Zones (CPZ) where anchoring 
and most types of fishing are banned to 
prevent cable damage.  These CPZ’s are 
enforced by New Zealand’s Ministry of 
Transport and consist of the following 
areas with fishing and anchoring in these 
areas producing the following fines $NZ 
2000  ($1,427) plus court and legal costs 
for recreational boat users offenses, $NZ 
100,000 ($71,334) for fishing and anchoring 
where commercial gain is involved, and $NZ 
20,000 ($14,279) in other cases. 26   
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U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY 
STRUC TURE
 The U.S.’ civilian and military 
undersea cable policymaking structure 
is byzantine and labyrinthine with many 
agencies having jurisdictional engagement 
in this arena.  U.S. laws are codified into 
the United States Code (USC), which is 
broken down into 54 title or subject areas.  
A quick online search of the USC using the 
U.S. House of Representatives Office of Law 
Revision Counsel website ht tps://uscode.
house.gov/ retrieves relevant citations 
from 10 of these 54 titles. 
 ▶ 3 USC 301 gives the Federal 
Communications Commission 
(FCC) authority to approve 
or revoke licenses to land or 
operate submarine cables in 
the U.S. without presidential 
approval. 27   
 ▶ 10 USC 113 gives the Secretary of 
Defense statutory authority to 
build such cables and  
pipelines. 28
 ▶ 26 USC 168 can allow for 
undersea cables to be tax-
exempt if part of an exclusive 
communication  link between 
the U.S. and one or more foreign 
countries. 29
 ▶ 33 USC 3 allow the Army 
Corps of Engineers to prepare 
regulations on areas of 
navigable waters featuring such 
cables to regulate explosives 
transportation in these waters.30 
 ▶ 33 USC 3204 allow the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) and 
the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration 
(FEMA) to integrate tsunami 
warning systems into federal 
undersea cables.31 
      This statutory cornucopia 
continues with 42 USC 9113, which imposes 
criminal penalties of up to two years, fines 
of up to $5,000, or both for negligently 
breaking of injuring undersea cables.32 
 ▶ 42 USC 9164 requires the 
Energy Department and other 
interested federal agencies 
and departments to establish 
and enforce regulations 
and standards of the safe 
construction and operation of 
undersea cables and equipment 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction.33  
 ▶ 43 USC 1331 gives international 
ships and aircraft navigation 
and overflight freedoms and the 
ability to lay undersea cables 
and pipelines under UNCLOS 
within the U.S.’ contiguous  
zone.34 
 ▶ 47 USC 26 gives military ship 
commanders to require foreign 
ship commanders to provide 
documentation from ships 
trespassing in areas where U.S. 
undersea cables are,35  and
 ▶ 47 USC 34 prohibits individuals 
landing or operating in the U.S. 
from using an undersea cable 
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to directly or indirectly connect 
U.S. territory with any foreign 
country without a written 
license from the President.36 
 
  The Commerce Department’s 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) regulates whether 
and how proposed submarine cables may 
be installed in National Marine Sanctuaries 
according to international agreements 
the U.S. is part of and according to 
international law.  NOAA is authorized 
to assess fair market value fees along 
with administrative and monitoring costs 
involved with the ongoing presence of 
commercial cables in National Marine 
Sanctuaries.  Additional NOAA cable 
responsibilities include administering the 
Coastal Zone Management Act, which seeks 
to manage coastal resources balancing 
economic development and environmental 
conservation.  The National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) is a trustee for coastal and 
marine resources including commercial and 
recreational fisheries, marine mammals, 
and endangered and threatened species 
and their habitats, which may be impacted 
by cable laying operations.  NOAA permits 
are required when underwater cable laying 
may impact marine mammals, which can 
include underwater noise and surface and 
underwater vessel activity. 37 
      Several Defense Department (DOD) 
entities are involved in undersea cable 
policymaking activities.  These include 
the Naval Seafloor Cable Protection Office 
(NSCPO).  Established in 2000, by Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command, NSCPO is 
the contact point between DOD and Navy 
seafloor cables.  Such cables are used for 
fleet underwater test and training ranges, 
sensor systems, communications and data 
links, and observation and monitoring 
systems. 38 
      The USNS Zeus is the U.S.’ only 
cable laying/repair ship and is responsible 
for transporting, deploying, repairing, and 
retrieving undersea cables.  It has been in 
service since 1984 and its contractors were 
General Dynamics and National Steel & 
Shipbuilding Corporation. Its length is 513 
feet, beam is 73 feet, it displaces 15,174 tons, 
maximum speed is 14 knots, and its crew 
size is 58. 39 
      The Army Corps of Engineers is 
authorized to regulate artificial islands, 
installations, and devices (including cables) 
on the U.S. outer continental shelf seabed 
with this authority being focused on how 
cables can potentially impact navigation 
and national security along with carrying 
out National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) analyses unless another agency has 
primary authority over the cable permitting 
process.  The Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) is responsible for securing 
and enhancing DOD telecommunications 
networks including the undersea 
communication constellation.  This agency 
also sponsors research in these areas and 
awards grants to contractors. 40
    The Energy Department’s 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) possesses some authority over 
proposed undersea cables to be laid on 
the U.S. continental shelf.  Examples of 
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such projects include constructing and 
operating hydrokinetic projects on the 
Outer Continental Shelf such as wave power 
generation facilities.  Cable laying related 
to such projects would involve assessing 
cable environmental impacts along with 
collaborating with the Army Corps of 
Engineers on possible national security and 
navigational impacts. 41 
      The Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) is responsible for 
submarine cables landing in the U.S.  The 
1921 Cable Licensing Act gives the FCC 
licensing authority covering “any submarine 
cable directly or indirectly connecting the 
United States with one foreign country, 
or connecting one portion of the United 
States with any other portion thereof.”  FCC 
authorities also include regulating the 
landing and operating of communication 
cables laid in U.S. coastal waters with 
Executive Order 10,530 (May 10, 1954) giving 
the FCC power to exercise presidential 
authority to issue, revoke, or withhold 
licenses to land and operate submarine 
cables in the U.S. after receiving the 
Secretary of State’s approval. 42   
      This agency’s International Bureau, 
Telecommunications, and Analysis Division 
is responsible for issuing licenses to own 
and operate undersea cables and landing 
stations in the U.S. and is also responsible 
for authorizing modifications, transfers, 
or assignments of existing cable landing 
licenses.  On August 29, 2017 this division of 
the FCC issued its 2015 International Circuit 
Capacity Report, which revealed that the 
total available capacity of U.S. international 
cables increased from 91,000 gigabit per 
second circuits (GPBS) in 2014 to nearly 
120,000 GPBS in 2015.  It also documented 
a 35% growth in submarine cable capacity 
between 2007-2015; with the Atlantic 
Region accounting for 40% of total available 
capacity, the Pacific Region for 37%, and the 
America’s Region for 23%.  This document 
also noted that the top foreign landing 
points for U.S. submarine cables were 
Colombia 9, Japan and the United Kingdom 
7, Panama 6, Brazil and Venezuela 5, and 
Australia and Mexico. 43  
   Various Department of the 
Interior agencies may become involved in 
undersea cable policymaking.  The Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) 
derives authority from the 2005 Energy 
Policy Act to regulate cables supporting 
energy production, transmission, and 
transportation from energy sources besides 
oil and gas from the Outer Continental 
Shelf and cables laid to construct and 
maintain oil and gas platforms. 44   Cables 
operators seeking to build cables through 
terrestrial or marine areas administered by 
the National Park Service and U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service go through those agencies 
approval processes.  In addition, the 
Antiquities Act of 1906 gives the President 
the authority to protect natural and cultural 
objects and potentially restrict cable laying 
through designating properties as national 
monuments.  A relatively recent example of 
this was President George W. Bush using 
Antiquities Act authorities to designate 
the Papahanaumokukea Marine National 
Monument in the northwestern Hawaiian 
Islands on June 15, 2006. 45
16
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RECENT U.S. LEGISL ATION INCLUDING 
SUBMARINE CABLE REGISTRY
 Undersea cables have received 
some attention in recent congressional 
legislation and debate, but they are 
primarily a niche subject for maritime 
security cognoscenti instead of being a 
focal point of international security and 
international economic analysis and debate. 
Rep. Rob Wittman (R-VA), a member of the 
House Armed Services Committee, has 
written that despite rhetoric about wireless 
and cloud computing the Internet does 
not involve invisible waves jumping from 
earth to space satellites and returning but 
by cables deep under the ocean’s surface.  
Since these cables are privately owned 
and maintained anyone with hostile intent 
and the ability to execute such intent can 
drastically impact our lives by attacking and 
destroying these cables.  Using historical 
analogies, Wittman mentioned British 
destruction of most German undersea 
cables during World War I and the Soviet 
Union cutting cables off eastern Canada 
in 1959.  He then noted that while cable 
laying and repair is easy for wear and tear 
and incidental damage there is not a clear 
and robust response plan for responding to 
intentional attacks on undersea cables.46 
      The Fiscal Year 2020 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) t 
of December 20, 2019 saw Congress 
create a Cable Security Fleet within the 
Transportation Department’s Maritime 
Administration (MARAD) to consist of 
two ships subsidized at $5 million per 
year through Fiscal Year 2035.  Further 
conditions of this legislation including 
giving these vessels operating in areas 
designated by the Coast Guard as 
possessing a high risk of piracy to engage in 
non-lethal defense measures to protect the 
vessel and crew from unauthorized seizure 
at sea and that the Defense Department and 
Coast Guard will determine what non-lethal 
defense measures these ships and their 
crew can take. 47 
      Despite the enhancement 
produced by the Cable Security Fleet’s 
creation, the convoluted complexity of U.S. 
Government Internet security programs 
was reflected in a September 10, 2019 joint 
congressional hearing by subcommittees 
of the House Armed Services and Oversight 
and Reform Committees on national Internet 
architecture security.  During the hearing, 
Rep. Michael Waltz (R-FL) asked Department 
of Homeland Security Assistant Director 
for Cybersecurity Jeannette Manfra who 
was responsible for defending undersea 
cables directly affecting the United States 
and its abilities to communicate in our 
economy and international waters.  Manfra’s 
response reflects the byzantine complexity, 
interconnectivity, and dysfunctionality 
inherent in undersea cable policymaking:
“The majority of submarine cables are 
privately owned by a mix of domestic 
and foreign entities. The protection of 
these cables is a complex question, 
considering they travel through domestic 
and international waters, some of which 
are contested areas. While the U.S. and its 
allies have significant interest in ensuring 
17
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the safety and continued functionality of 
submarine cables, it will require a ‘‘concerted 
effort’’ from the United States and its allies 
to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of the data that traverses 
subsea systems, in addition to the physical 
security of the cable and cable landing 
station. While DHS is the communications 
sector-specific agency per PPD–21, the 
current responsibility for defending undersea 
cables landing in the United States involves 
a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach, which 
includes the Navy in our Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) and the Coast Guard within our 
12 mile nautical sovereignty zone. Team 
Telecom— primarily made up of executive 
branch agencies DOD, DHS, and DOJ—acts 
as an advisory committee to the FCC in 
matters related to foreign investment 
into US domestic communications 
infrastructure. Letters of Assurance (LOAs) 
and Network Security Agreements (NSAs) 
are memorandums of understanding 
between the USG and the cable owners/
operators that govern the location of 
assets, types of principal equipment, 
physical access controls, and other relevant 
factors surrounding the functionality and 
protection of undersea cable systems. 
DOD, DHS, and DOJ enforce Team Telecom 
agreements through periodic compliance 
and mitigation visits to cable landing sites, 
network operations centers, and other 
relevant infrastructure. The Department of 
Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
investigate and prosecute criminal acts 
and espionage-related activities. These 
activities are informed by reporting from the 
intelligence community and various other 
federal agencies.” 48
    The House Armed Services 
Committee version of the FY 2022 NDAA 
passed on September 10, 2021 recognized 
the increasing importance of undersea 
warfare by directing the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to provide 
this committee a briefing on unmanned 
undersea and surface vehicles by March 
1, 2022.  Contents of this report were to 
include the extent to which the Navy 
has successfully identified all critical 
technologies necessary for unmanned 
maritime systems; how the Navy tracks 
technological development for unmanned 
maritime systems; and whether unmanned 
maritime technology systems meet Navy 
requirement and mission needs.  It is 
uncertain whether this language will be 
included in the final FY 2022 NDAA. 49 
     Various international associations 
and government organizations also 
influence undersea cable policymaking.  
The International Cable Protection 
Committee, (ICPC) is an intergovernmental 
and commercial company organization, 
founded in 1958, whose membership 
consists of submarine telecommunications 
and power cable operators and cable ship 
owners and operators, which strives to help 
members improve undersea cable security 
by exchanging relevant environmental, 
legal, and technical information.  ICPC 
includes more than 170 members from 65 
countries. 50    
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS  
AND ORGANIZ ATIONS
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      The United Nations Commission 
on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratified in 
1982 by many countries, but not the U.S., 
whose objections include surrendering U.S. 
sovereignty and freedom of action, being 
subject to international lawsuits that would 
be economically injurious and harm U.S. 
environmental and military interests, and 
have to transfer seabed mineral resource 
royalties to the International Seabed 
Authority and though it to corrupt and 
unaccountable nations. 51  
      The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) established in 1948 as 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization, the IMO Convention entered 
into force in 1958, and IMO received its 
present name in 1982.   IMO describes 
its purpose as “to provide machinery for 
cooperation among Governments in the field 
of governmental regulation and practices 
relating to technical matters of all kinds 
affecting shipping engaged in international 
trade; to encourage and facilitate the 
general adoption of the highest practicable 
standards in matters concerning maritime 
safety, efficiency of navigation and 
prevention and control of marine pollution 
from ships.”  52 
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INFRASTRUCTURE 
DISRUPTION & DAMAGE
A ny country, individual, or transnational terrorist group could seek to damage or 
destroy undersea cables.
 Two countries of particular 
concern to undersea cable infrastructure 
to the U.S. and its allies include Russia and 
China.  An early example of U.S. concern 
over Soviet/Russian attempts to destroy 
undersea cables occurred between 
February 21-25, 1959 when the Soviet trawler 
Novorossiisk disrupted communications 
between various U.S., Canadian, and 
European locales by damaging five 
transatlantic cables near Newfoundland 
in a rectangle bounded by the following 
coordinates:  Latitude 49°24 N; Longitude 
50°12 W; Latitude 49°32 N; Longitude 49°48 
W; Latitude 50°13 N; Longitude 51°00 W; and 
Latitude 50°22 N; Longitude °50.36 W.  In 
response, at 11:55 AM Eastern Standard Time 
on February 26, 1959, the commander of the 
USS Roy O. Hale, using his authority under 
the 1884 Convention for the Protection 
of Undersea Submarine Cables, sent an 
unarmed party of one officer and four 
enlisted men to board the Novorossiisk 
and examining the ship’s papers with its 
commanders consent.  The U.S. announced 
RUSSIA AND CHINA
it reserved the right to make claims for 
damages against Moscow and the Soviet 
Union protested against this activity. 53 
      U.S. concern over Russian 
undersea cables continued in the 1970s, 
when the specially adapted nuclear 
submarine USN Halibut spent several 
months tapping Soviet communication 
cables in the Sea of Okhotsk north of Japan 
as part of Operation Ivy Bells. 54  The current 
edition of The Military Balance notes “the 
recent focus on the potential vulnerability 
of the undersea cable network raises issues 
of how to monitor, identify, and…defend 
against attacks on these vital information 
arteries…this and the recent events in 
the Gulf point to an increased need for 
persistent surveillance so that hostile 
activities can be identified, attributed, and 
tackled.” 55 
      An October 25, 2015 New York 
Times article referencing U.S. intelligence 
and military personnel maintaining 
that Russia’s increasing geopolitical 
assertiveness could lead it to sever fiber 
optical cables at hard-to-access locations 
to halt the instantaneous communications 
abilities these cables provide with 
devastating consequences.  Earlier in 
2015 the Russian spy ship Yantar, carrying 
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two self-propelled deep-sea submersible 
craft, slowly cruised the U.S. east coast to 
Cuba the site of a major U.S. cable landing 
point at Guantánamo Bay.  During this 
journey, Yantar was constantly monitored 
by U.S. satellites, ships, and planes with 
naval officials saying the ship and its 
submersibles were capable of cutting 
cables miles below the ocean’s surface.  
Such operations are consistent with 
increasing Russian assertiveness in locales 
as varied as Crimea, Syria, and eastern 
Ukraine and reflect Moscow’s emphasis on 
hybrid warfare to cripple NATO decision-
making. 56 
      Speaking before the Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI) on December 
14, 2017, British Chief of Defense Staff Air 
Chief Marshall Stuart Peach, maintained 
that the threat from Russia’s Navy with 
modernized conventional submarines and 
ships represents “a new risk to our way of 
life.”  A story on this event also noted that 
retired U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis 
said Internet cables could be a tempting 
target for the Russians, other powers, and 
that U.S. and its NATO allies should prepare 
for increased maritime hybrid activity from 
China, Iran, and Russia. 57 
      Recent evidence also 
demonstrates Russian efforts to control 
the Northern Sea Route and gain exclusive 
access to its seabed mineral resources 
could also increase this region becoming 
a focal point for undersea cable conflict.  
Russia is backing building an extensive 
14,000 kilometer/8,680 miles network of 
fiber optical cables along its northern 
littoral from Finland to Japan and including 
China, which will impact Moscow’s relations 
with the West and Beijing.  This project 
is estimated to cost $800 million to $1.2 
billion while providing data speeds of up 
to 200 terabytes per second.  The Russian 
Government and Russian businesses do 
not currently possess necessary financial 
capitalization to build this and are seeking 
foreign investors through Scandinavia, 
Japanese, and one Russian company in the 
Arctic Connect consortium.  Megafon, the 
Russian participant in Arctic Connect has 
close ties with the Russian Federal Security 
Service (FSB) and Ministry of Defense.  This 
project is expected to be completed by 2023 
and would likely give the FSB the ability 
to monitor and read much data passing 
between Japan and Europe  and incentivize 
Moscow to covertly install additional 
undersea cable systems, which could 
include sensing networks comparable to the 
Integrated Undersea Surveillance System 
(IUSS) used by the U.S. Navy to support 
antisubmarine warfare and tactical forces 
by detecting, classifying, and providing 
timely information reporting on submarines 
and other contacts of interest. 58 
      China is also heavily interested in 
undersea cables and this has been reflected 
in its business acquisition practices and 
military force development including 
deployment of 12 underwater drones in 
the Indian Ocean between December 
2019-February 2020. Chinese tech 
companies like Huawei Marine Networks 
have laid 59,499 kilometers/36,488 
miles of undersea cables in 98 projects 
encompassing the Indo-Pacific, South 
Pacific, and Atlantic regions.  These firms 
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have gone from 7% of undersea cable 
projects in 2012 to 20% in 2019.  New 
Chinese fiber-optic submarine cables area 
supplemented by the 33-satellite Beidou 
Navigation Satellite System seeking to 
provide an alternative to U.S.-led Global 
Positioning Satellite and achieving global 
coverage by 2020.  Beidou including 
Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, and Thailand 
covers over 30 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
countries.  China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) 
also includes the Pakistan and East Africa 
(PEACE) Cable connecting Pakistan to Kenya 
with additional extension to France in 2021; 
a cable linking Cambodia and Hong-Kong; 
and the 25,000 km/15,500 mile Asia-Africa-
Europe (AAE) cable involving China Unicom.  
Australia had to intervene to stop Beijing 
building an undersea cable to the Solomon 
Islands. 59 
      Beijing’s increasing geopolitical 
assertiveness jeopardizes the undersea 
cable infrastructure of adjacent powers 
such as South Korea.  China may use its 
increasing military power in undersea and 
other maritime domains and likely will 
engage in lawfare to engage in hostile 
attacks against undersea cables and 
promote its illicit undersea territorial claims 
in the Indo-Pacific region.  This may be 
done through using People’s Liberation 
Army (PLAN) assets or using its maritime 
militia and fishing fleets to coerce countries 
and ships representing these countries 
requiring the use of undersea cables 
near China in order to engage in gray 
zone warfare against these countries to 
acquiesce in Beijing’s extraterritorial claims.  
Such behavior is ultimately consistent 
with the doctrine of unrestricted warfare 
espoused by the People’s Liberation Army 
to compensate for its perceived inferiority 
against the U.S. and its allies during a high 
technology war. 60 
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
AND SOLUTIONS
The past year has seen the world become familiar with the disastrous 
economic, national security and public 
health implications of infectious disease has 
demonstrated by the Coronavirus pandemic. 
It is now time for world opinion to become 
aware of the economic and national 
security implications of losing access to the 
information transmitted by undersea cables. 
Cable information and data transmission 
have gone from the initial 17 hours and 
40 minutes it took to transmit messages 
between President Buchanan and Queen 
Victoria to the fastest cables transferring 
data at speed of nearly 25 terabytes per 
second, which is twice the amount of the 
annual data generated by the Hubble Space 
Telescope. 61 
      Losing such access for even 
a short amount of time would have 
asphyxiating consequences, which would 
cascade across the globe and take a 
long time to work around and overcome. 
Undersea cables and their geoeconomic 
and geopolitical criticality involve Mahan’s 
emphasis on command of the sea, Corbett’s 
on seapower’s critical communication 
requirements, Mackinder’s on the 
importance of the Eurasian heartland, 
and Spykman’s emphasis on the rimland’s 
strategic importance. 62   Numerous works 
of varying quality and perspectives and 
numerous international strategic trends, 
exacerbated by the Coronavirus pandemic, 
are placing increasing emphasis on the 
vulnerability of the U.S. and its maritime 
allies to supply chain disruptions and 
hostility from countries as varied as China, 
Iran, North Korea, and Russia.  Some of 
these works are beginning to recognize the 
vitally important role undersea cables play 
in our emerging geoeconomic, geopolitical, 
and strategic environment and urge the 
U.S. and its maritime allies to take a more 
assertive stance against the powers 
threatening the international geopolitical 
order. 63 
      Despite the acute physical and 
social strain imposed by the Coronavirus, 
there are several steps political, technical, 
and military steps democratic countries can 
take individually to ensure the stable and 
uninterrupted flow of information and data 
through undersea cables.  These include:
 Exploring the possibility of driving 
a wedge between Russia and China by 
emphasizing how Russia’s ties with Vietnam 
puts Moscow in potential with Beijing over 
POLITICAL
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South China Sea maritime disputes and 
access to energy resources.
     Promote more transparency, 
oversight, and standards into the Maritime 
Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative 
while emphasizing that the lack of such 
transparency could produce attempts 
by Beijing and its allies to attack critical 
undersea cables as a means of gaining 
coercive geopolitical advantage.  An 
attribute of this would be working to ensure 
that companies under Chinese and Russian 
leverage such as Rostelecom and Huawei 
are thwarted in their attempts to gain 
influence in democratic maritime countries, 
which could be used to further Beijing’s and 
Moscow’s interests.   Maritime countries 
should also use the American Enterprise 
Institute and Heritage Foundation’s China 
Global Investment Tracker as a template 
to counter Chinese influence on undersea 
cable infrastructure investment by avoiding 
cable companies having ties with Chinese 
or Russian cable firms, which could result 
in use of these cables being curtailed or 
severed.
      Australia, European countries, 
India, Japan, and the U.S. using economic 
development as a means of exerting 
geoeconomic and geopolitical leverage to 
dissuade nations from favoring Chinese and 
Russian efforts to restrict the free flow of 
information and strategic communications 
through undersea cables. 64   
 The U.S. supporting partners 
and allied nations such as Japan 
POLITICAL /MILITARY
TECHNICAL
through multilateral exercises, advanced 
technological transfers, weapons sales, 
and greater intelligence sharing to preempt 
potential attempts to seize control of 
undersea cables.
  NATO and its Allied Maritime 
Command must transition from a 
Eurocentric maritime orientation to 
expand its operations into the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean to protect against potential 
threats to submarine cables.
 Encourage India to expand 
its emphasis on homeland defense to 
include maritime operations and capability 
including engagement with countries such 
as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
to increase their commitment to securing 
undersea cable communications.
 The importance of powers 
outside of China and Russia thinking of 
how undersea cables secure, store, and 
share information from one location to the 
next.  Private sector accomplishment of 
maritime cybersecurity for national security 
is to large to be accomplished without 
governmental involvement.  Controlling 
key information flows originating in the 
global undersea fiber optic cable networks 
is critical for strategic victory in multiple 
future conflict scenarios. This also applies 
to U.S. Navy missional and operational 
objectives in the critical IndoPacom 
region.65  
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 Training U.S. and allied maritime 
forces in monitoring and repairing 
undersea cables.   Increasing lethality of 
ships in U.S. Cable Security Program and 
liberalizing rules of engagement for crews 
of these ships to use deadly force against 
hostile actors trying to disrupt or destroy 
submarine cables.  Assigning at least one 
cable repair ship to regions covered by 
U.S. geographic unified military combatant 
commands is highly desirable.
 Training U.S. and allied maritime 
forces in monitoring and repairing 
undersea cables.   Increasing lethality of 
ships in U.S. Cable Security Program and 
liberalizing rules of engagement for crews 
of these ships to use deadly force against 
hostile actors trying to disrupt or destroy 
submarine cables.  Assigning at least one 
cable repair ship to regions covered by 
U.S. geographic unified military combatant 
commands is highly desirable.
 Steps for enhancing undersea 
cable security include incorporating 
assessments of attacks on undersea 
cable infrastructure and best practices for 
responding to such attacks into national 
military strategy documents.  Conducting 
national risk assessments and establishing 
a national risk register to identify undersea 
cable risks to maritime countries.  Including 
secure cable landing sites into national 
critical infrastructure facilities and 
incorporate necessary security measures.  
Establishing Cable Protection Zones such as 
Australia’s around coastal areas with high-
value communications corridors.  Deploy 
better monitoring on cables by requiring 
private sector contractors to place sensors 
capable of detecting sonar frequencies near 
key undersea infrastructure and along cable 
routes.
 Promote greater geographic 
diversity of undersea cables and increase 
criminal penalties for disrupting or 
destroying such cables.  Increase building 
of backup systems to promote resiliency 
and redundancy.  Consider pushing for a 
new international treaty to protect undersea 
cables with stiff penalties for disrupting and 
destroying them.  Such an agreement is only 
realistically possible among democratic 
maritime nations since authoritarian nations 
would not be honest brokers in enforcing 
such agreements.  Increase naval exercises 
involving undersea cables and regularly 
review maritime capabilities among NATO 
and other global democracies.  Make it clear 
that maritime countries will not tolerate 
attacks upon this critical infrastructure 
and are willing to use military force against 
those attacking undersea cables. 66 
 It is also essential for national 
security leaders in the world’s democratic 
countries to repeatedly educate their 
residents on the critical importance of 
undersea cables to national economic and 
strategic interests.  This is not likely under 
the Biden Administration, but congressional 
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concerned with this subject must take the 
lead in this endeavor until the U.S. has a 
presidential administration that takes this 
matter seriously.  Other countries must also 
take the lead in stressing the importance 
of this subject and the need to protect this 
vital infrastructure.  Failure to rectify these 
deficiencies and educate the public could 
result in a cyber Pearl Harbor/911 cataclysm 
that will be extremely difficult to recover 
from and make the Coronavirus’ discomfort 
and disruption seem minor.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE 4: CABLE LAYING
Source:  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 67
FIGURE 5: CABLE CROSS SECTIONS AT VARIOUS DEPTHS
Source:  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 68
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FIGURE 6: SUBMERGED PLOUGH BURYING UNDERSEA CABLE
Source:  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 69
FIGURE 7: REMOTELY OPERATED VEHICLE (ROV)IXV 
Source:  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 70
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FIGURE 8: GUANTANAMO BAY CABLE LANDING SITE
Source:  Defense Visual Instrumentation Distribution Service (DVIDS) 71
FIGURE 9:  NAVAL ENGINEER SECURES CONCRETE STAKES NEAR  
GITMO CABLE LANDING STATION
Source:  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 72
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FIGURE 10:  SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORK IN NORTHEAST AND  
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Source:  Submarine Cable Network in Northeast and Southeast Asia-National Bureau of  
Asian Research Maritime Awareness Project 73
FIGURE 11:  SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORK ACROSS THE PACIFIC OCEAN
Source:  Submarine Cable Network Across the Pacific Ocean 74
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FIGURE 12:  EUROPE-INDIA GATEWAY
 
 
Source:  Europe-India Gateway 75 
FIGURE 13: GLOBAL SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORK
Source:  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 76
31
2021 FORCES Team Undersea Cables
This selective table of 24 cables, their distances, and areas of coverage, initial operating 
dates, and ownership demonstrates the vast geographic proliferation and dispersion of 
undersea cables. 
FIGURE 14:  SELECTED GLOBAL SUBMARINE CABLES AND OPERATORS 
SOURCE:  TELEGEOGRAPHY





















































































1,042 km/646 miles 
 
Carcevalos, Portugal; 
Accrs, Ghana; Conakry, 
Guinea; Lagos, Nigeria; 
Luanda, Angola, 
Duynefontein, South Africa 
 
Seward, AK; Warrenton, OR 
 
Hollywood, FL; St. Croix 
U.S. Virgin Islands; Port of 
Spain, Trinidad & Tobago; 
Camuri, Venezuela; 
Cayenne, French Guiana; 
Fortaleza, Brazil 
Abu Talat, Egypt; Aden, 
Yemem; Bari, Italy; Cape 
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France; Jeddah, Saudi 
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Busan, South Korea; 
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Pacific City, OR; Kapolei, 
HI; Pago Pago, American 
Samoa; Mangawhai, New 
Zealand; Sydney, Australia 
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Nedonna Beach, OR; 
Maruyuma, Japan; Geoje, 










The following chart from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence documents possible 
threat scenarios facing undersea cables 
FIGURE 15: GLOBAL SUBMARINE CABLE THREAT MATRIX 
Source:  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 78
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FIGURE 16: NEW ZEALAND CABLE PROTECTION ZONES
Source:  New Zealand Ministry of Transport
FIGURE 17: COOK STRAIT CABLE PROTECTION ZONE  
 
Source: Transpower New Zealand 80
Area 1: Great Barrier Island 
Area 2: Hauraki Gulf 
Area 3: Kawau Island 
Area 4: Whangaparoa Peninsula 
Area 5: Muruwai Beach 
Area 6: Takaroa
 




Area 9: Hawke’s Bay
 
Area 10: Maui A & B
 
Kupe Gas Project Protection Area –– no number
 
Maari Development Protection Area –– no number
 
Tui Area Development Protection Area –– no number 
Pohokura Protection Area — no number 79
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FIGURE 18: USNS ZEUS 
Source:  U.S. Military Sealift Command 81
FIGURE 19: ARCTIC CONNECT PROJECT 
 
Source: Polar Journal 82
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